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Abstract 
Achievement goal theory is one of the most popular theories of achievement 
motivation. Techniques researchers have used to assess goals include 
standardized questionnaires and interviews. One curious finding is that 
participants whose self-report questionnaire responses strongly indicate they 
operate with a performance goal do not make performance goal responses in 
subsequent interviews. In this paper, we consider the nature of this 
divergence using a mixed methods approach and discuss how a third 
technique, the Implicit Association Test (IAT), might help address divergent 
goal responses. More broadly, we suggest that implicit measures may offer 
an additional and/or alternative technique for assessing the prevalence of 
psychological constructs thought to be underpinned by processes involving 
social cognition. 
Keywords: Achievement motivation; Goal Theory; Implicit 
Association Tests; Self presentation; Social Cognition. 
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Different Methods, Different Results: Examining the implications of methodological 
divergence and implicit processes for achievement goal research 
 
In recent years, Mixed Methods Research (MMR) has provided researchers with 
opportunities to explore how synergistic combinations of methods may offer the nuanced 
understandings necessary for meaningful study of complex phenomena (Teddlie & 
Tashakkori, 2010, p. 9). MMR studies are governed by the challenging of paradigmatic and 
methodological dualisms in favor of continua. Using methodological eclecticism and 
triangulation, carefully integrated research designs draw from both the qualitative and 
quantitative traditions, emphasise the best aspects of each method and minimise the impact of 
its limitations. Ultimately, using MMR can provide greater confidence in research findings. 
However, while obtaining convergent results from different investigative methods 
seems to imply robust measurement of an underlying concept, the ontological implications of 
divergent results are often less clear. Through thorough re-examination of methods and 
conclusions via further study (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003, p. 17), divergence can indirectly 
lend empirical support for the revision of models and theoretical understandings of multi-
faceted phenomena (Erzberger & Prein, 1997, p. 141). When divergence is encountered in 
fields where even a loosely designed mixed methods approach is applied, researchers must 
engage in this re-examination, confronting whether divergent findings spring from a lack of 
reliability and validity in one or more of the utilized methods, or if they are suggestive of a 
greater complexity inherent in the phenomenon under study. The divergence question 
remains unanswered in the study of achievement goals, a prominent theory within the 
literature on achievement motivation.  
The past decade has seen achievement goal theorists discuss a variety of conceptual 
and methodological issues. One such issue has been the disparate conclusions derived from 
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studies using questionnaires compared to studies using interviews. A present concern lies in 
accounting for, and addressing, the divergence across achievement goal measures. This paper 
explores this issue utilizing the principle of divergence in MMR. Current achievement goal 
measures are re-examined and problematized by highlighting the potential consequences of 
using researcher-defined constructs in questionnaires and of demand characteristics in 
participant responses during interviews. The paper then considers the over-dependence on 
self-report in achievement goal research especially in light of research outlining the 
limitations of such self-reports. The final section offers a relatively unique, alternative 
method for assessing goal adoption, namely, the implicit association test (IAT, Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). IATs purport to capture attitudes that are (wittingly or 
unwittingly) not reported by individuals. Typical examples of such attitudes are biases 
towards (and away from) racial groups, political parties, religious affiliations and body shape. 
IATs rely on reaction times to assess levels of congruence between associated stimuli; the 
longer the reaction time, the greater the level of incongruence. In this paper, we argue that the 
nature of achievement goals makes them ideal candidates for examination using IATs. IATs 
thus offer researchers a potentially powerful additional tool to address the divergence in 
findings across methods in current achievement goal research. Before focusing on the 
methodological issues, however, a brief introduction to goal theory is provided for readers 
new to the concept and constructs. 
Achievement Motivation and Achievement Goals 
Achievement motivation is the study of behavior in achievement settings, most 
commonly in educational contexts, although theories of achievement motivation can apply in 
any achievement-focused domain (e.g., business, medicine, and sports). Popular theories of 
achievement motivation include expectancy-value theory (Wigfield & Eccles, 2000), intrinsic 
motivation theory (Deci, 1975; Deci & Ryan, 1985), self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 
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1985), and interest theory (Renninger, Hidi, & Krapp, 1992). Achievement goal theory has 
developed alongside these theories, amassing over 1,000 (published) studies over the past 25 
years (Hulleman, Schrager, Bodmann, & Harackiewicz, 2010).  
Though achievement situations are simultaneously social and academic, and students 
may consequently possess multiple goals, including social goals (Wentzel, 1989, 1991; Urdan 
& Maehr, 1995) and work avoidance goals (Nicholls, 1989), research on achievement goals 
(Nicholls, 1984; Diener & Dweck, 1978, 1980) focuses purely on the purposes for students’ 
competence-related behaviors (Elliot, 2005, p. 53). Goal theory started as a simple dichotomy 
between goals that were characterized as mastery (the desire to understand material) or 
performance (the desire to show ability to others) (e.g., Diener & Dweck, 1978, 1980). A 
trichotomous model followed, adding an avoidance valence to performance goals, such that 
performance avoidance was characterised by a desire not to perform poorly (see Elliot & 
Harackiewicz, 1996). In 2001, a full two-by-two model was proposed that included mastery-
avoidance (a desire to avoid missing opportunities to learn) (Elliot & McGregor, 2001). Most 
recently, a 3 x 2 model (Elliot, Murayama, & Pekrun, 2011) has been proposed, emphasizing 
differences between task-, self-, and other-based standards and more carefully aligning 
achievement goal constructs with the theorized core of competence.  
Despite the progression of theoretical models, the meaning of ‘goal’ often remains 
implied and inexplicit in research. This leads not only to diverse operationalizations and 
conclusions about findings but also to difficulty in obtaining a consistent body of results that 
translates into practical recommendations (Elliot & Murayama, 2008, p. 613). Clearer 
definitions can stem from reactions to how goals are operationalized in studies. For example, 
when Urdan and Mestas (2006) interviewed students about the reasons behind their goals, 
and suggested that different reasons behind goals may lead to different achievement 
outcomes, Elliot (2005, p. 65) argued that while both were valuable, goals, understood as 
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aims, and the underlying reasons for these aims, are to be held as conceptually distinct. 
Disagreements have also occurred over whether students’ achievement goals are state-like 
and context-dependent or trait-like and akin to personal dispositions, and the implications of 
this for interventions. This definitional difficulty is in part due to a lack of explicit discussion 
regarding how goals are mentally represented (Pintrich, 2000, p. 96). In this paper, 
achievement goals are believed to be cognitively represented in a connectionist-type model 
(Pintrich, 2000; Smith, 1998), where purposes are nodes, linked within a network to other 
nodes, together representing an individual’s “definition of success, role of effort and errors, 
and standards” (Pintrich, 2000, p. 98). In achievement settings, paths between these nodes are 
activated in different ways based on how they interact with factors in the individual’s 
surrounding environment. Paths that are often activated in the same way may be strengthened 
over time and therefore more readily activated, producing a sort of intraindividual stability 
(Pintrich, 2000, p. 99) between, for example, success defined as obtaining good grades, effort 
considered as a necessary aspect of doing well, errors understood as learning experiences, 
and the task and one’s previous performance held as the standards for judging one’s success. 
This goal conceptualization has several implications. Goals are dependent both on contextual 
influences and internal representations; studying them requires examining how they are 
activated and which patterns of activation are strongest; and an individual’s awareness of the 
path of activation is not required for it to impact on their thoughts and behaviors (Pintrich, 
2000, p. 98).  
Experimental and Questionnaire Methods  
Over the last three decades, achievement goal theorists have examined if differences 
in achievement can be explained by students’ mastery or performance goal pursuit. In early 
think aloud research conducted by Dweck (Diener & Dweck, 1978), mastery responses to 
failure on tasks were largely understood as adaptive because students attributed their failure 
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to effort, maintained positive affect and expectations for success, persisted in the face of 
challenge, and were able to retain good performance even after failure. In contrast, students 
with performance responses displayed helpless, maladaptive behavior, negative affect, 
diminished expectations of success, lowered performance, ability attributions, lack of 
persistence, and also chose tasks that were either too difficult or too easy.  
Researchers have since employed experiments and questionnaires, and later 
interviews, to investigate students’ goals. In experiments, goals have been assigned to 
participants randomly and induced using task descriptions and instructions that allude to 
normative evaluations or learning aspects. Experimental manipulations have explored 
achievement goals as differential predictors of performance (Butler, 1987), students’ choice 
of tasks, performance in the face of difficulty, attributions, and expressions of affect (Elliott 
& Dweck, 1988), use of effective learning strategies (Stipek & Kowalski, 1989), levels of 
information processing (Graham & Golan, 1991), and intrinsic motivation (Elliot & 
Harackiewicz, 1996). Theoretically allowing for the measurement instead of manipulation of 
achievement goals (Elliot & Church, 1997, p. 219), questionnaires have also been used in an 
attempt to correlate reported achievement goal orientations with achievement-relevant 
outcomes, such as performance approach goals with academic attainment (Elliot & Church, 
1997), mastery goals with adaptive help-seeking behaviors (Ryan & Pintrich, 1997), mastery 
goals with interest (Harackiewicz, Barron, Carter, Lehto, & Elliot, 1997), performance 
avoidance goals with academic self-handicapping (Midgley & Urdan, 2001) and mastery 
goals with self-regulation (Middleton & Midgley, 1997). On the whole, findings from 
questionnaires have tended to agree with those of experimental manipulations, as, for 
example, in Elliot and Church’s (1997) precursor to the Achievement Goal Questionnaire, 
where positive relationships were observed between mastery goals and intrinsic motivation 
and performance goals and graded performance.  
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Problems with Experimental and Questionnaire Methods 
Though experimental manipulations and self-report studies of achievement goals 
often produce similar results, there remain problems with the implications of their findings 
for causal models involving goals and outcomes. In addition to the often acknowledged 
difficulty of obtaining ecological validity in experimental manipulations, there is  potential 
difficulty in ensuring that participants have truly pursued the goal that the researchers 
intended to induce, and that this has subsequently led to differentiated achievement-related 
outcomes by goal. Contributing to this problem are issues with task instructions that are 
meant to activate only the desired goal but may activate another goal simultaneously. An 
example of this occurs in Elliot and Harackiewicz (1996) with the supposedly performance 
approach description of the task “this session will give you the opportunity to demonstrate 
that you are a good puzzle solver” (p. 464) and the performance avoidance description “this 
session will give you the opportunity to demonstrate that you are not a poor puzzle solver” (p. 
464), where the emphasis may have shifted from normative comparison to solely “trying to 
do well” (Brophy, 2005, p. 170), which is traditionally regarded as mastery. A further issue 
regarding causality in the goal-outcome relationship lies in the use of questionnaires. Here, 
levels of past performance (e.g., on exam scores) may impact on students’ reports of 
performance approach goal pursuit, instead of the pursuit of performance approach goals 
leading to high performance, in much the same way that endorsing such goals would be 
unrealistic for those with histories of lower attainment (van Yperen, 2003; Brophy, 2005). 
Therefore, despite the similarity of results for these methods, which may be perceived by 
some as a strength of achievement goal research, it is clear that more research is required to 
better elucidate the nature of the causal, rather than purely correlational, relationships 
between goals and performance.  
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Additional problems with using questionnaires have been highlighted by an 
interesting methodological debate that has arisen around the construct labelled the 
performance approach goal. Researchers have suggested that the goal of “comparing oneself 
to others” has been either over-emphasised (Brophy, 2005), or that it under-emphasises many 
other goals that pupils seem to have (Lemos, 1996; Urdan, 2004a, 2004b; Urdan & Turner, 
2005; Urdan & Mestas, 2006). One key criticism has surrounded the usefulness of 
questionnaires commonly used to assess goal adoption (e.g., Achievement Goal 
Questionnaire, AGQ-Revised, Elliot & Murayama, 2008; Patterns of Adaptive Learning 
Scales, PALS, Midgley et al., 2000). For example, Urdan and Mestas (2006, p. 355) 
suggested that questionnaires pose a danger of overestimating how often mastery and 
performance goals occur spontaneously in classroom settings. When faced with a 
questionnaire with Likert-scale response categories, they suggest, participants are not 
mentioning achievement goals spontaneously or in their own words, and their endorsement of 
achievement goals may be due to a ‘now-that-you-mention-it’ effect (Urdan & Mestas, 2006, 
p. 354). In addition, questionnaire statements that reflect important theoretical distinctions 
can be interpreted by respondents in ways that do not match the researchers’ intentions. With 
no follow-up questions to verify understanding, students’ incomprehension and achievement 
goals may be masked (Urdan & Mestas, 2006, p. 362; see also Ciani & Sheldon, 2010). The 
consequences of using questionnaires are that participants are only able to agree or disagree 
to differing extents with the available items. They cannot ask for clarification or indicate if 
they agree more with part of the statement than the whole. So even if questionnaires are 
claimed to measure rather than manipulate students’ goals, formats that only provide the 
options to agree or disagree with what will be understood by researchers as performance-
approach, performance-avoidance, mastery-approach, and mastery-avoidance items give the 
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impression that students themselves actually do pursue these goals and only these goals 
(Brophy, 2005, p. 168).  
Using interviews in achievement goal research 
Such problems with experimental and questionnaire methods have led to the 
exploration by some of using interviews to access learners’ achievement goals (Lemos, 1996; 
Brophy, 2005; Urdan & Mestas, 2006). To avoid researcher-defined operationalizations of 
goals, advocates of interviews suggest investigating the meanings students themselves give to 
achievement goals (Urdan & Mestas, 2006, p. 364) in more naturalistic and non-laboratory 
classroom conditions (Lemos, 1996, p. 154). What is most interesting in terms of goal theory 
is that when researchers have used interviews to examine goals, differences between theory 
and responses have emerged. For example, Urdan and Mestas (2006) asked participants to 
complete the PALS and then interviewed them. Focusing on participants who rated 
performance avoidance items highly, Urdan and Mestas found that students repeatedly 
provided approach reasons to explain their endorsements of avoidance items (Urdan & 
Mestas, 2006, p. 363). This mismatch between what the item was supposed to be measuring 
and what students thought the item meant suggested participants’ difficulty understanding the 
avoidance form of the goal. Brophy (2005, p. 171) has also pointed out the infrequency of 
students’ spontaneous mentions of performance goals in interview research (i.e., Lemos, 
1996; Urdan, 2001; Urdan, Kneisel, & Mason, 1999). For example, when Lemos (1996) 
asked Portuguese sixth graders open-ended “what for” questions (e.g., “What do you want?”, 
“What are you trying to accomplish?”), she found that the goals students reported related to 
achievement per se included working goals (e.g., “to finish it and to go on to the next one”, 
“to get it done”), evaluation goals (e.g., “desire to be positively evaluated and/or…avoid 
negative evaluations concerning academic classifications”), learning goals (e.g., “to know 
more about”, “to find out how”), and enjoyment goals (e.g., “activities in which they engaged 
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for pleasure, enjoyment, and fun”). Even in the goal most similar to the aforementioned 
characterization of performance goals, the evaluation goal, students only mentioned 
succeeding in terms of grades, rather than being seen to do well or better than one’s peers 
(Brophy, 2005, p. 171).  
In short, when probed in different ways, students seem to suggest a whole range of 
goals. Although Senko, Hulleman and Harackiewicz (2011) provide evidence that students do 
spontaneously report performance goals more frequently than reported by Brophy and 
colleagues (see Harackiewicz, Barron, Carter, Lehto, & Elliot, 1997; Levy, Kaplan, & 
Patrick, 2004; Urdan, 2004a; Job, Langens, & Brandstätter, 2009), it is clear that in some 
research, participants do not make any mention of performance goals.  
Despite clear evidence from questionnaire-based research that students adopt 
performance goals, interview-based studies suggest either that they do not, or at least that the 
prevalence of performance goals is considerably overstated. Such equivocal findings pose a 
critical divergence in the study of achievement goals: which method is capturing the 
construct? Both, neither, or only one of them?  Moreover, how can researchers even assess 
which method might be more effective? 
What is particularly striking from research conducted using interviews is how 
convinced participants are about their goals. In fact, no study has reported participants saying, 
“I’m sorry, I really do not know what my goals are” nor, when asked about items that they 
have rated on an achievement goal questionnaire, have participants replied, “I don’t know 
why I said that”. Clearly participants were confident they knew what goals they were 
pursuing. One self-evident truth assumed from the questionnaire-based studies is that 
participants were reporting accurately on the reasons for their achievement behaviors. On the 
face of it, the claim seems entirely reasonable; individuals know the reasons why they 
behave. However, a large body of research suggests differently. 
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Limited Introspective Accessibility 
As early as the 1970s, questions were raised about whether social psychologists were 
justified in asking participants about the reasons for their behavior, choices, and evaluations 
(for a review, see Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Cognitive psychologists Mandler (1975), Miller 
(1962), and Neisser (1967) controversially proposed that “we may have no direct access to 
higher order mental processes such as those involved in evaluation, judgment, problem 
solving, and the initiation of behavior” (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p. 232). While this claim 
stemmed from work on the relatively automatic processes underpinning perception and 
memory, more research was required to justify generalizing such claims to social psychology, 
where much self-report research depended (and still does) upon the assumption of 
introspective access. Reviewing work on cognitive dissonance, attribution, subliminal 
perception and complex judgment tasks, Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977, p. 233) seminal 
research on self-reports argued there was indeed evidence that people were often unable to 
accurately account for factors that were impacting on their responses.  
For example, in one study carried out by the authors, participants were provided with 
a list of word pairs to memorize. Interested in whether participants were aware of influences 
on their associative behaviors, the researchers provided some participants with pairs that were 
meant to activate associations with desired words that could then be elicited in participants’ 
responses during a later word association task (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p. 243). The critical 
word pairs participants were asked to memorize in the first task contained words such as 
“ocean” and “moon”. In the subsequent standard word association exercise, in which the 
experimenters provided participants with probe words (i.e., “Detergent”) and asked the 
participants to utter the first word that came to their minds, they found that words they had 
intentionally semantically cued (target words, i.e., “Tide”) were twice as likely to be uttered 
by the participants who had been exposed to the critical word pairs. When asked about what 
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influenced their responses, participants provided reasons such as “My mother uses Tide”, or 
“I like the Tide box” (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p. 243), with only a third of participants, when 
directly asked, ceding that  the word pairing memorization may have been a possible 
influence. Nisbett and Wilson found similar instances in a wide range of social psychological 
research, including their own work examining positioning effects and reported reasons for 
product appraisal (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), and Latané and Darley’s (1970) classic 
bystander effect. Nisbett and Wilson concluded from such studies that participants’ self-
reports were often inaccurate in three different ways. Participants were strikingly unable to 
report accurately that an influential stimulus existed (i.e., Nisbett & Schachter, 1966), that 
they were responding to this stimulus (i.e., Valins & Ray, 1967), or that these processes were 
even occurring (i.e., Bem & McConnell, 1970).  
The consistent inaccuracy of participants’ self-reports led Nisbett and Wilson to 
question where participants were actually drawing self-reports from, if not from direct 
introspection. One answer came in the form of Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) 
representativeness heuristic, by which “a particular stimulus will be deemed a representative 
cause if the stimulus and response are linked via a rule, an implicit theory, a presumed 
empirical covariation or overlapping connotative networks” (in Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p. 
249). In other words, the often inaccurate reports implied that participants’ (strongly held) 
beliefs were not the product of awareness or memory of some internal process, but a priori 
theories linking stimuli and responses (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p. 233). Participants were 
assessing a situation and (subconsciously) reporting what might be a plausible reason for 
their behavior. Support for this reasoning came from studies in which observers not 
participating in a situation were asked to explain reasons for the behavior of those actually 
participating. The studies showed that the observers’ predictions were identical to reports 
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provided by participants, who were assumed to possess some introspective access that could 
be called upon in their self-reports (Nisbett & Bellows, 1976).  
Not only is there considerable evidence that individuals are poor at (accurately) 
reporting reasons for their behavior, there is actually a very good reason. As human beings, 
we have built up a store of experience of causal connections between events and when asked 
to report the reason for our own behavior, we use that experience. So in the study by Latané 
and Darley (1970), in which a greater number of bystanders reduced one’s own likelihood of 
helping in an emergency, why would participants say “the reason I didn’t help was because 
there were so many other people around?” when much more plausible and personally 
defensible reasons such as “I was too busy” were available? Translating the evidence from 
studies reported by Nisbett and Wilson (1977), when asked about their goals, learners (quite 
reasonably) base their goal self-reports on post hoc rationalizations of their achievement 
behavior, rather than direct introspection and accessing of the goals that directed it. 
Implications for Achievement Goal Research and the Reply from Goal Theorists  
In this paper, we have used Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) comprehensive review as an 
invaluable source of examples. The evidence that supports claims of poor introspective 
access is actually vast and varied (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Gazzaniga, 2000; Gopnik, 
1993; Kihlstrom, 1987; Wegner, 2002). More importantly for this paper, the findings have 
compelling implications for the large amount of achievement goal research that has been 
conducted using interviews: learners may actually be unable to access and thus report 
accurately on why they have followed certain goals, whether they have pursued certain goals, 
or that they have even pursued goals in the first place. When asked, participants may simply 
put forth plausible, implicit theories about what directs their achievement behavior. These 
theories and self-reports may be informed by the frictions extant between certain positions or 
behaviors (e.g., not helping when a greater number of others are present; wanting to do better 
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than others) and an individual’s concerns about how this reflects on them (e.g., an unethical 
human being; being overly competitive), thereby supporting the earlier critique of 
achievement goal interviews wherein demand characteristics and social desirability were 
provided as possible explanations for respondents’ reluctance to spontaneously endorse 
performance goals.  
Crucially, for the implications of Nisbett and Wilson’s findings on limited 
introspection and ability to accurately self-report to apply to achievement goal research 
requires that goals share the same cognitive characteristics as the inaccessible higher mental 
processes Nisbett and Wilson discuss. In addition to the theorized cognitive representation of 
achievement goals provided earlier, this question can be considered in light of the attention it 
has received within motivation research (Murphy & Alexander, 2000), and in the 
achievement goal literature more specifically (Elliot & Fryer, 2008; Lemos, 1996; Pintrich, 
2000).  
Murphy and Alexander (2000) conducted a review of motivation terminology from a 
useful outsider’s perspective, and discussed the issue of accessibility. Trying to understand 
why there were fewer motivation studies of younger children, they suggested that younger 
individuals may lack the ability to reflect and articulate such concepts when asked (Murphy 
& Alexander, 2000, p. 32). Given Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) work, this logically applies 
not only to younger children, but to all who are asked to report on their achievement goals. 
Murphy and Alexander (2000) also observed that the fundamental assumption made by 
motivation researchers, that their respondents can accurately self-report, was challenged 
philosophically by James (1890), who argued that most of our daily experiences and 
behaviors are set in motion unconsciously and that as a result, we can only know a limited 
amount about ourselves at any one moment (in Murphy & Alexander, 2000, p. 37). 
Ostensibly as a result of this assumption, Murphy and Alexander’s (2000) review of the 
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motivation literature did not reveal much explicit discussion of accessibility. Instead, they 
often found the phrases learners’ “beliefs” or “perceptions” (Murphy & Alexander, 2000, p. 
38) accompanying self-reports, and took these to represent motivation researchers’ 
acknowledgement that human access to motivational mechanisms is limited (Murphy & 
Alexander, 2000, p. 39). 
Pintrich’s (2000) direct reply addressed the issue of accessibility from an achievement 
goal perspective. By distancing goals from unconscious constructs such as motives or needs, 
Pintrich suggested that Murphy and Alexander’s (2000, p. 37) questions regarding the 
accessibility of motivation were therefore irrelevant to the valid operationalization of goals 
(Pintrich, 2000, p. 96). However, Nisbett & Wilson (1977) only use ‘motive state’ in line 
with developments in motivation research up until the time of writing, and Murphy and 
Alexander (2000) use it because their review is not only limited to achievement goal 
research; the concerns, therefore, remain. Despite this, Pintrich (2000, p. 96) and others (e.g., 
Lemos, 1996, p. 151; see also Elliot & Fryer, 2008) see goal theory as stemming from the 
cognitive revolution, with its associated assumptions. Goals are assumed to be cognitively 
represented in ways that are consciously accessible, accounting for Murphy and Alexander’s 
(2000) limited findings of its explicit discussion.  
Elliot and Fryer (2008) argue that a significant aspect of the definition of goals is that 
they are consciously committed to, and that such commitment begins with conscious 
intention. However, they simultaneously refer to research conducted by Bargh and his 
colleagues (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001) on automatic 
processing, ceding that “once in place in the cognitive system, goals may be activated and 
may operate in a thoroughly automatic, nonconscious fashion” (Elliot & Fryer, 2008, p. 246). 
This claim is made without discussion of its implications. When and how often, for example, 
must such goals be consciously committed to, become part of the cognitive system, and then 
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operate automatically? Is it every time that a new task is provided in an achievement setting 
or can goals that have previously been activated for similar tasks become automatically 
activated given similar environmental conditions? Can learners access these automatic, 
nonconscious goals, and report on their activation and adoption within everyday achievement 
settings? Acknowledging research findings on automaticity is interesting not only given the 
implications of Bargh’s findings for the continued use of self-report measures in achievement 
goal research, but considerably more so in terms of the centrality of especially Elliot in 
producing achievement goal self-report measures, coupled with the sustained absence of 
automaticity from the definition of achievement goals.  
Despite a wealth of findings implying the limitations of introspective accessibility, 
there remains a reluctance to engage with its implications for using self-reports in measuring 
social psychological constructs. At least for achievement goals, this can be argued to result 
from assumptions linked to the origins of achievement goal theory in the cognitive 
revolution. 
The Automaticity of Goal Setting  
However, the cognitive revolution also resulted in work that strongly challenges goal 
theory assumptions. Crucially, this includes research by Bargh and his colleagues on the 
interactions between conscious and automatic mental processes. Acts of the former are 
characterized by awareness, intention, effort, and control (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p. 463), 
and would seem to describe how Pintrich (2000), Lemos (1996), and the studies that Murphy 
and Alexander (2000) reviewed conceptualize goals. Automatic mental processes, which 
interest Bargh, and which Elliot and Fryer (2008) acknowledge, have not yet met the same 
definitional consensus within the literature. One conceptualization involves processes that are 
originally consciously intended and goal-driven, such as wanting to learn how to ride a 
bicycle, which become more efficient and automatic over time and through practice (Bargh & 
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Chartrand, 1999, p. 463), while another is characterized by the effortless, unintended, and 
unaware perception and analysis of environmental factors (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p. 463-
464).  
Both conceptualizations of automatic mental processes revolve around the concept of 
“limited conscious attentional capacity” (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p. 464). Baumeister, Tice 
and colleagues (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Muraven, Tice, & 
Baumeister, 1998) have investigated the detrimental effects on performing a second, minor 
self-regulatory act (e.g., avoid laughing while watching a funny movie) in an unrelated 
activity after participants have been asked to perform a first, also minor self-regulatory act 
(e.g., do not think about white bears). The limits to conscious attentional capacity that they 
have observed have led them to suggest that because even small conscious self-regulatory 
acts use this capacity, as little as 5% of our daily acts of self-regulation can occur consciously 
(in Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p. 464). Thus the remainder – the majority – of our mental 
processing occurs on a nonconscious, automatic level. While it could be argued that 
achievement goals would make good candidates for this 5%, the highly similar nature of 
many academic tasks would suggest the greater likelihood that conscious goal decisions are 
made in the presence of novel or extraordinarily challenging academic tasks, and are absent 
from the everyday achievement settings that achievement goal researchers are generally 
interested in measuring using self-reports.  
According to Bargh and Chartrand (1999), when a specific situation is presented to 
the learner, a conscious choice is made regarding response to that situational stimulus, a goal 
or purpose is decided, and then acted upon. With time, the repeated presentation of this 
situation or situations with similar features results in a bypassing through automatization of 
the conscious choice, such that the effortless, unintentional, and unaware perception of the 
situation activates the goal, its operation, and its fulfilment. This process, which can be 
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intentionally or unintentionally acquired, is illustrated in Figure 1. Importantly, this raises 
similar questions to those surrounding Elliot and Fryer’s (2008) definition, especially in 
terms of when that conscious choice is made, whether students can comment on if it was 
consciously made, and in line with the model this paper proposes for the nature of the 
cognitive representation of achievement goals, how these paths of activation among relevant 
nodes are strengthened and readily activated over time.  
 
Figure 1: (a) Conscious, Intentional Mediation of Goal Pursuit within a Situation and 
(b) Automatic Activation and Operation of Goals by Situational Features Following 
Repeated Choice of the Same Goal (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p. 470) 
 
 
	  
	  
 
 
 
 
Using priming procedures, Bargh and his colleagues have been able to empirically 
examine this perception-to-action logic for the automatic, that is, the unintentional, effortless, 
and nonconscious, activation of both cognitive and behavioral goals. In an experiment 
examining cognitive goals, Chartrand and Bargh (1996) found that unobtrusively exposing, or 
priming, participants to synonyms of either the word ‘memorization’ or ‘evaluation’ in an 
unrelated first activity led them to adopt these concepts as goals for dealing with a set of 
(a)	  
(b)	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unrelated information presented to them later on. In other words, participants were unaware 
that they possessed these goals, which had been activated by triggers in their environment 
(i.e., the primes) and yet acted on them. This replicated, albeit with implicit primes, the 
results of Hamilton, Katz and Leirer (1980), where participants explicitly asked to follow an 
impression-formation goal not only remembered more of the material but also gave evidence 
of having better organized the information in their memory than those instructed to memorize 
the material (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p. 469).  
Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel (2001, experiment 4) examined 
the automatic activation of behavioral goals by priming the goal ‘to achieve’ in some 
participants and not others. They found that when participants were asked, via intercom, to 
stop working on an activity in which they were given two minutes to find and note down as 
many words as they could using a set of Scrabble tiles, 57% of those who had been primed 
with the achievement goal, as opposed to only 22% of the control group, continued working 
so as to obtain a higher score.  
These experiments suggest that goals can become automatized processes to limit 
cognitive overload, and can guide cognitive and behavioral responses. Even unwitting 
perception of specific environmental factors can trigger goal adoption, with the same 
emotional and behavioral effects as intentional, consciously set goals. Indeed, Chartrand 
(1999) has shown that inducing success and failure affects mood and self-efficacy beliefs 
even for participants unknowingly primed with the goal ‘to achieve’. Because the process of 
automatization itself is automatic, and often not intended, goals may become automatic and 
activated in situations without our conscious awareness that this has occurred (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 1999, p. 469), affecting our ability to comment on them. Just as in Nisbett and 
Wilson’s (1977) work, in each experiment, Bargh and his colleagues probed participants after 
they had outwardly pursued the implicitly primed goals, as indicated by the researchers’ 
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dependent measures, and found them entirely unaware of having done so (Gollwitzer & 
Bargh, 2005, p. 633). These studies directly challenge achievement goals theorists’ 
assumptions that goals are conscious and accessible. When such research is placed alongside 
common achievement goal measures that rely entirely on these assumptions, goal theorists 
must begin to acknowledge the implications conceptually and methodologically.  
Implicit Association Tests and Achievement Goal Research 
So far we have outlined the dilemma for researchers trying to capture achievement 
goals and have suggested that these goals may be part of a system that is more unconscious 
than conscious. What is less clear is how researchers could ever test this claim. Is it possible 
to access performance goals using a method other than interviews or questionnaires?  
In the past, motivation researchers used a nonconscious measure, the Thematic 
Apperception Test (TAT, McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953), to measure 
achievement motives, today seen as antecedents to more concrete achievement goals (Elliot 
& Church, 1997). The TAT, a projective test first developed by Morgan and Murray (1935), 
involves presenting participants with ambiguous picture cards and asking them to tell stories 
about these pictures. Participants’ descriptive stories about the pictures are thought to reveal 
details of their current conscious or unconscious states. Implicit motives (McClelland, 
Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989) were theorized to be inaccessible to self-report, and as such 
the construct presented a candidate for exploration using the TAT (e.g., McClelland & 
Liberman, 1949; Veroff, Wilcox and Atkinson, 1953; Feather, 1961). Because findings from 
TAT and self-report measures that aimed to assess achievement motives were seldom 
correlated (see Schultheiss & Brunstein, 2001), McClelland (1980) argued that self-attributed 
motives, as measured by questionnaires, predict immediate, situation-specific choices 
(McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989), while implicit motives, measured by story-
based measures, predict spontaneous behavior over varying periods of time.  
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Recently, Brunstein and Schmitt (2004) have compared implicit and explicit methods 
for assessing individual differences in achievement motives. However, instead of using the 
TAT, they experimented with an Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998) and found yet again that implicit and explicit measures of achievement 
orientation were uncorrelated. However, while participants’ self-reports about achievement 
orientations only predicted self-reports about whether students had enjoyed the task (a mental 
concentration test), Brunstein & Schmitt’s IAT successfully predicted students’ behavior. 
 IATs were developed in the early 1990s to meet the perceived need for indirect 
measures that could access those cognitions that self-report measures could not (Greenwald et 
al., 2002, p. 4). The test measures the strength of associations between concepts in an 
individual’s mind, as well as the extent of the individual’s awareness of and belief in these 
associations (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998, p. 1464). Test procedure involves 
presenting participants with a computerized sorting task where they have to respond as 
quickly as possible in categorizing presented stimuli to specified categories 
(https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/).  
In a typical test, participants are first presented with a computer screen which has the 
words “Good” and “Bad” in the top left and right of the screen, respectively. Single target 
words are presented in the middle of the screen and participants have to indicate whether the 
word is good or bad by pressing the “E” or “I” on the keyboard, respectively. Typical words 
to be categorized include “joy”, “love”, “peace” and “wonderful” as good words, and 
“awful”, “agony”, “terrible”, and “evil” as bad words. Once the participant has practiced this 
categorization, a second set of categories is presented, for example, with “African American” 
and “European American” on the top left and right of the screen, respectively. Images of the 
faces of members of these two groups appear in the center of the screen, and participants 
must very quickly categorize faces as African American using the “E” key, or European 
ACHIEVEMENT GOALS, DIVERGENCE, AND IMPLICIT PROCESSES 
	  
23	  
	  
American using the “I” key. After a similar number of practice trials, the third, critical block 
of the experiment begins. Participants allocate stimuli (previously presented good and bad 
words and face images) to combined categories using the same key (i.e., “African American” 
and “Good” pressing the “E” key, “European American” and “Bad”, pressing “I”). In the 
fourth (practice) and fifth (critical) blocks of the experiment, participants carry out the same 
categorization, but with the categories switched around (i.e., “African American” and “Bad”, 
“European American” and “Good”) in order to address ordering effects.  
The logic is that quicker reaction times imply the two concepts are automatically 
associated and congruent in the participants’ minds. When the word pair is not automatic and 
incongruent in the participant’s mind, reaction times are slower. So if participants are 
consistently quicker to categorize negative stimulus words to “Bad” when it is paired with 
“African American” than when it is paired with “European American”, the results would 
suggest a preference for European Americans, with degrees of slight, moderate and strong 
preference also calculated. Because the IAT requires very quick response latencies, it avoids 
intervening thoughts and the time to come up with “self-presentation strategies” (Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998, p. 1465), which were earlier discussed as some of the problems 
with interviews, and affect, albeit to a lesser extent, anonymous questionnaires. In line with 
our proposed conceptualization of the cognitive representation of goals as a system of nodes, 
quicker reaction times would indicate the automatic activation by stimuli words of those 
strengthened and most readily activated paths. If the activated nodes on that path are 
collectively congruent with a positive approach to normative comparison, for example, then 
when a performance approach stimulus word appears, a faster categorization response would 
theoretically be seen. If there is no association or the path is collectively incongruent with a 
positive approach to such a concept, then a slower response time may be seen. As such, IATs 
might be one answer for researchers interested in assessing achievement goals. 
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The idea that IATs can be used to assess constructs that have commonly been 
assessed using questionnaire and/or interview techniques is not new. In addition to Brunstein 
and Schmitt’s (2004) successful adaptation for implicit motives, authors within achievement 
goal research have also begun employing IATs. At the American Educational Research 
Association conference in 2011, Urdan and Cafasso reported their initial attempts to build a 
‘Like Me’ IAT, in which participants were presented with words describing achievement 
goals in the center of the screen and had to allocate these to either a “Like Me” or a “Not Me” 
category. Stimulus words included “improvement”, “understanding”, and “learning” for 
mastery goals, “winner”, “best”, and “competitive” for performance approach goals, and 
“inferior”, “worse”, and “incompetent” for performance avoidance goals. In total, there were 
eight words per goal construct, and these appeared in random order to be categorized. One of 
the concerns for this IAT was the range of words used as stimuli. Nouns and adjectives may 
have variable processing times, thereby providing an alternative explanation for slower 
reaction times that is not attributable to a lack of automatic association. In addition, IATs 
determine whether an association is automatic, and the individual’s implicit preference, by 
measuring response times, not by explicitly asking the participants if they are like or unlike 
the words appearing on the screen in front of them. Another example of an IAT for 
achievement goals is the IAT-Type (IAT-T) measure piloted by Marzouq, Carr, and Slade 
(2012), which uses the 2 x 2 model of achievement goals and has so far demonstrated good 
reliability for each of the goals. One concern regarding this IAT is the use of more than one 
word at a time as the stimulus. Although this is held constant for all goal stimuli, it does not 
rule out a potential impact on processing time, again unattributable to a lack of automatic 
association..  
In addition, the current authors have designed and tested two dichotomous model (i.e., 
mastery and performance goals) achievement goal IATs. One example is the Valence IAT, 
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which pairs “performance goals” with “good” and “mastery goals” with “bad”, and then 
switches in accordance with usual IAT procedure to “performance goals” and “bad” with 
“mastery goals” and “good”. Participants are shown performance words (e.g., “compete”, 
“overtake”) or mastery words (“learn”, “understand”). In this version of the IAT, we have 
tried as much as possible to use only verbs for stimulus words, and to use words that apply 
uniquely to one type of goal. Our Valence IAT operates on the underlying assumption that 
the speed with which participants categorize performance or mastery words into these 
combined categories, for example by putting the word "compete" into the combined category 
of "performance goals" and "bad", gives an idea of how strongly associated these combined 
categories are in their heads, their goal preference and ultimately an insight into one part of 
the strengthened activation path connecting often activated patterns of nodes.   
Clearly, although IATs have become an established research tool in fields such as 
stereotypes and prejudice (for a review, see Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007) and self-
esteem and self-concept (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000), their use in studying achievement 
goals is nascent. Indeed, it is still to be established whether an IAT that shows quicker 
reaction times for word pairs associated with “performance” and “good” is evidence that 
participants operate with such goals in achievement settings. A further issue lies in the 
implications of comparing IAT measures with questionnaire and interview methods. It may 
be found that IATs correlate more with questionnaires than interviews, or differently 
depending on goal type, or that they do not correlate at all with self-reports, as was often 
found with the Thematic Apperception Test and is demonstrated with the IAT in Brunstein 
and Schmitt’s (2004) study. More important will be identifying those achievement behavioral 
outcomes and the occasions on which the IAT can, and self-reports cannot, predict (and vice 
versa). Also, we still need to establish if goals are initially conscious and then move to being 
automatic because when this is established, IATs might actually be able to help identify when 
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this shift occurs. As research builds, various tests of validity will help to establish the place of 
the IAT in goal research. For theorists interested in MMR, IATs represent an interesting 
opportunity to examine not just goals but a whole variety of attitude-based phenomena.    
MMR and Achievement Goals Re-visited 
To summarise, one of the most popular theories in achievement motivation has a 
problem: researchers cannot agree how to study the key constructs. Moreover, using different 
methods has resulted in divergent outcomes and conclusions. Considerable evidence from 
work on limited introspection coupled with evidence from social psychology suggests that 
individuals can behave in ways contrary to their espoused beliefs. Implicit Association Tests 
have been shown to be useful indicators of non-conscious beliefs.  
For researchers interested in studying goals using MMR, the question is whether 
current interview and questionnaire methods should be used in conjunction with implicit 
methods. If research using interviews and questionnaires continues to produce divergent 
results, then researchers need to further assess current methods and look to other methods. 
IATs seem a useful and important way forward. This is especially so if, as evidence suggests, 
students’ achievement goals may be adopted both consciously and non-consciously. It seems 
that it is no longer sufficient to use interviews and questionnaires without considering the 
implicit/explicit distinction because current divergence in findings just produces differences 
in positions. It is no longer enough to say questionnaires produce different results from 
interviews, or to assume that goals can be accessed entirely through self-reports. We think it 
important for goal theorists to employ a variety of methods when studying goals, but this 
means the field has to reach some agreement regarding whether the constructs can be 
triangulated using different methods. If goal theorists want to develop useful predictive 
models, then constructs need at least to be consistent across different measures.  
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For researchers who do not study goal theory, the implications of IATs are potentially 
far-reaching and infinitely more controversial; divergence between methods implies the 
potential inadequacy of self-report to provide accurate introspective insight. This is not our 
position. We urge researchers to re-examine the constructs they research by using techniques 
that appeal to the literature underpinning IAT development. When we sat down with many of 
the authors we have cited and asked them why they were so sure students were reporting their 
goals accurately, the reply was often “how can you ever be sure?” Our reply is that it is better 
not to assume you can or cannot but to develop methodologies that build confidence about 
the reliability and validity of findings. Current divergence in findings suggests 
methodological inappropriateness and goal theorists need to address the problem. IATs may 
be one way forward when examining achievement goals; they may be the way forward for 
other constructs as well. 
 
 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, adopting the mixed methods concept of divergence as a lens to re-
examine current achievement goal methods highlights serious self-report limitations. Given 
that considerable evidence suggests our ability to access these goals is limited, paradigms 
used for measuring achievement goals (and similar social psychological constructs) must 
supersede a dichotomous view of qualitative and quantitative methods and even a lateral 
continuum, to consider the implications of a three-dimensional model, incorporating methods 
that distinguish between the consciously accessible and inaccessible. This further level of 
research should begin to shed light on both how achievement goals are mentally represented 
and the interplay between conscious and nonconscious motivational factors activated in 
everyday classroom tasks. This will ultimately enhance researchers’ understanding of the 
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achievement goals students pursue and how these can be better conceptualised, measured, 
and, if need be, acted upon. 
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